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Summary  findings
Countries  sometimes  use export controls on raw  She  finds that (under reasonabie  assumptions  about
materials  to encourage  domestic  processing.  The  elasticities  of supply)  export controls  can transfer
motivation  is usually  to assure  raw materia!s  at low  significant  profits from the raw materials  producers  to
prices  for domestic  industries,  although  exports arc  the processing  industries,  causing  significant  net losses  to
sometimes  controlled  in an attempt to increase  export  the economy  and a substantial  net decrease  in export
earnings  (by  promoting  exports of higher value-added  earnings.
processed  goods  rather than raw materials).  Quantitative  export controls will be even more
The problem  is, export controls hurt raw material  distortive  if processing  industries  have  any monopsony
producers and cause  economic  distortions  that result in  (single-buyer)  power. This is quite likely  in developing
net losses  to the country. The impact  of raw material  countries  with small  industrial  bases  - or in economies
export controls  on total export earnings  is ambiguous:  in transition,  where central planning  has left a legacy  of
the decline  in raw  material  exports when production  is  very large  firms in highly  concentrated  industries.
discouraged  by lower  prices  may outweigh  the effect  of  With monopsony  power in the processing  industry,
increased  exports  of processed  goods.  both output and exports of final products  can be reduce
Takacs  develops  a simple  partial equilibrium  model  of  by quantitative  export controls on raw material  inputs.
export controls on raw  materials  to investigate  the  The quantitative  control bestows  effective  monopsony
impact of export  restrictions  and to estimate  the  power on the processing  firm and encourages  it to
potential magnitude  of the transfers  bet-:en  groups and  exploit  this monopsony  power by reducing  output. If the
the net costs  of the export-control  regimes.  raw materiAls  could be freely  exported, processors  would
Her estimates  of the magnitude  of transfers and costs  not be able to effectively  exercise  monopsony  power.
of export controls  on raw cashmere  (in Mongolia)  and
wood products  (in Romania)  indicate  that the transfers
and costs  may be substantial.
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Export controls on raw materials  have been used by countries  to encourage  domestic
processing  activites.2 Such controls can take the form of complete  prohibitions  on exports, export
quotas, export licensing requirements,  or export taxes.  They are usually motivated  by a desire to
assure raw materials at low prices for domestic  processing industries, but other stated purposes
include preventing exporters  from selling without  a letter of credit from the importer or selling at
prices considered  too low.  Export controls  on raw material  are also jusfied  as a method of
increasing  export eaings  by promoting exports of higher value-added  goods rather than raw
materials.
Export controls on raw material or inrmediate  inputs increase the effective  rate of protection
to the processing industries  by lowering  input costs.  But they create costly distortions  and efficiency
losses and they benefit owners of processing  facilities at the expense  of raw materials producers.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple partial equiiibrium  model of export controls on raw
materials  to investigate  the impact  of the restrictions and generate  rough estimates  of the potential
magnitude  of the transfers between groups and net costs of the regimes. Section II develops  a model
that links the markets for material inputs and final goods under the assumption  of competitive  markets
for inputs and outputs, indicates  the nature of the transfers and net costs generated  by export
restrictions  on inputs, and indicates  a method for calculatng estimates  of the size of the transfers and
costs.  Section  m applies  the model to two case studies: export licensing requirements  for raw
cashmere in Mongolia  anl export prohibitions  and quotas for wood products in Rom-ii.  Section  IV
then extends  the analysis  to a monopsonistic  market structure in the final goods industry. A
monopsonistic  processor of raw materials may be a relevant market structure for developing  countries
that lack a broad industrial base and for transitional economies  in which central planning  led to high
industry conentation,  and thus a single processor or small mnmber  of buyers of certain raw material
inputs.2
II.  Raw material export controls with perfectly competdve markets
Suppose  that a raw mal  hiput, I (such as raw cashmere) is used as in input into the
production  of a final product, F (such as cashmere sweaters).  Suppose  also that the country  under
consideration  is small, so that it cannot influence  the price of either the raw material or the final
product in world markets. 3 To ease graphical  presentation  and link tie markets for Inputs  and
outputs, define units of input so that one unit of Input is required to produce one unit of output. 4
The perfectly competlt!ve  processing industry is willing to process more inputs into output the higher
the value-added  per unit In processing:
QS . S (PPr  (1)
where Qs is the quantity of final product supplied,  PF is the price of the final good, PI is the price of
the raw material input and PFPI is the value-added  per unit.
Suppose  that demand for the final good within  the country depends upon the price: s
d  = D(PP)  (2)
Net exports of the finished  product wiUl  be the difference  between the quantity supplied  and
the quantity  demanded:
XF  QP  O  QF  (3)
Suppose  that the raw material is produced  by a perfectly competitive  input industry and that
the quantiy of the raw material input supplied  depends on its price:
Qf  = S 1 (Pr)  (4)
Suppose  that the raw material is not demanded in the domestic market except as an input to3
the final  goods  processing  industry. This assumption,  along  with  the definition  of the 'units' of
input,  implies  that:
ox' - Or'  ~~~~~~(5)
Exports  of the raw material  will  be the difference  between  the quantity  supplied  and  the
quantity  demanded  as inputs  by the domestic  industrr:
x-  '  QU - Qz - St (P1)  - (  FPP  )  (  6  )
The equilibrium  in this model  under  free trade  is shown  in Figure 1. If there were  no trade
restrictions,  the domestic  prices  of both  the final  good  and the raw material  would  be equal  to .ieir
prevailing  world  market  price. The supply  curve  of processing  as a function  of the value-added  is
shown  in the upper  panel  of Figure 1 by the curve  S(V). The height  of the curve  Is the value-added
per  unit of final  good  produced,  V.  Tho  processing  industry's  supply  curve  of the final  product  under
free  trade, Sp*,  would  lie above  S(V)  by the raw mateial Input  costs  per unit, Pf.  The demand
curve  for the product  is Dp.  The upper  panel  of figure 1 shows  the market  equfilibrum  for the final
product  under  free  trade. If the world  market  price of the final  good  were Pf,  the world  market
price  of the input  were  Pf,  and  there  were no trade  rerictions, the quantity  demanded  would  be
Dp*, the quantity  supplied  by the processing  Industry  would  be QP*,  and Qp*-Dp*  (= Xp*)  would
be exported.
Ihe market  for the raw  material  is shown  ia the lower  panel  of figure 1. The units  along  the
horizonta  axis  measure  the quantity  of "packcages"  of inputs,  where  each 'package' represents  the
inputs  needed  for one unit of output  The  price measured  along  the verdcal  axis is likewise  the price
per 'package' of inputs. The domestic  raw  materis  industry  supply  curve  is shown  by SI. If the
price  of the raw  materia in the world  market  were  PT, the domestic  raw materials  industry  would4
produce  an output  QI*. At this price  of the raw material,  the domestic  fnal goods  processing
industry  supply  curve  would  be Sp*, the output  of final  goods  would  be Qp.  and the demand  for
raw matedals  on the part of the domestic  processing  Industry  would  be D*. ITe quantity  exported
woulti  be XI* (=Qi*-DI*). Export  earings from finl  goods  exports  would  be PTXp* and export
earnings  for raw materis exports  would  be PTXi*.
Suppose  that  the govrnment now  controls  exports  of the raw  matera by imposing  an export
quota  that allows  no more  than  a maximum  amoulat  to be exported 6. Suppose  this system  is
enforced  through  an export  licensing  system. In terms  of the model,  the domestic  price of the raw
material  will  no longer  necessarily  equal  the world  market  price  because  producers  are not free to
export. A biding quota  restriction  implies  that  the quantity  of exports  is given,  and the domestic
price  of the raw  material  input  would  be determined  by equation  (6) as the price at which  the
difference  between  the quanity of raw matrial supplied  and  the quaty  demanded  would  equal  the
maximum  amount  allowed  to be exported.
Given  that  the quantity  demanded  depends  upon  the output  of the processing  Idustry, and
given  that  the position  of !he  processing  industry  supply  curve  depends  upon  the price  of the raw
materid, the new  equilibrium  would  be determined  jointly  in both  markets. As the raw  material  input
price  falls  due to the export  restrction,  input  costs  of the processing  industry  fil  and the processing
industry  supply  curve  shifts  downward,  or to the right. At a constan  final  product  price, output  of
the final  product  (and  therefore  the quantity  of the raw material  demanded  by the processing  industry)
increases.  Figure  2 illustrates  the new  equilibrium  after  an export  restriction  liming raw marl
exports  to Xi is Imposed. The  price of the Ilput will sede at P?, where  the quantity  demnded
(equal  to the quantity  of final  good  supplied  at the world  market  price  P'y and  Input  price P? plus
XI) equals  the quantity  of input  supplied  along  S 1. The  decline  in the equilibrium  raw  material  price5
will  reduce  raw material  production  from Q%  to QIn. n the final  goods  mnarkt,  output  Inereases
from  Qp  to Qp'.
The raw  matewal  eport reticdon  hurts  producers  of the raw material  ad  discourages  raw
material  production  vad exports,  but increases  profits  of the procesing Industry,  as well  as production
and exports  of the fiMlW  good. lbe gains  to the  procesing istry  and  the losses  to the raw material
produces, as well  u  the net efficiency  losses  from the restriction,  can be Identfied  and esimated. In
the market  for raw matria,  producer  profits  fail becaus of fahing  prices.  3 loss in profits  Is
usually  identified  as a los in  wduceu surplus equa to area  adge  in the lower  panel of figure  2.
Tho  height  of the raw material  supply  curve  shows  the marginal  cost  of producing  each  extra  unit.
When  price  faUs  to Pq, reveues decrease  by area adrsge  but costs  decrease  by only gdre,  so net
Income  declines  by area adge. Part of this  loss (area  abfe=area  hijkl consists  of a  ransfer  from raw
materials  producers  to the  processing  industry  in the form of higher  profits  due  to lower  Input  costs.
Another part (area bcg)  represe  a transfer  from raw materials  producers to the recipients of export
licenses,  who  are able  to buy  the raw  materal on the domestic  market  at P? and  sell abroad  at Pl.
The remainder  (area  cdg)  is an efficiency  loss  because  the extra  units of raw matDrl Ql*-',  which
would  have  been  eported to earn  Pf  in the absence  of the export  restriction,  would  only  have  cost
an amount  equal  to the height  of the supply  curve  to produce. With  the export  restrction, these  extra
units of the raw  material  will  not be ptoduced  and sold  abroad  for more  than  the cost of producing
them. Area cdg  thus  represents  a net effidiency  loss to the country.
These  transfers  and  efficiency  losses  can in principle  be measured. The loss to producers  of
the raw materil equas area adge:6
Area adge  - dP 1 Qr +  2  dQ  dPz
'  dP  QOr  +x  2  Ox dP1 dPz
dPr Qr ( I  +  21  Of AI)  (7)
* dP 2. Q  (12  t  ,e  dP V-.!Lx(1+  1  SP)
Pz  2+  2  PzV
Oxpl.+ 1 X2  Xp
Z  2  x  r
whare cl  (dQ/dP1)(PI/Q 1) h the elascity of  upply  of the raw material, VI-  PIQI  the value
of raw materi  producdon,  dP 1 (.P1P-P;?).  dQ[  =  (QQ)ad  w = dPI/PI.  rhe efficieny loss
area  cdg will  be equal  to the last team  of equaton (7).
The  part of the loss to raw  material  producers  that is transferred  to export  license  recirients  Is
area  bcgf:
Area  bcgf  = dP1 X1 (6)
-if  r
where  Vf is the value  of raw material  exports.
In the market  for the processed  good,  the processing  industry  gains  area  hild. The industry
marginal  cost  curve  shifts  downward  from Sp*  to SF' which  reduces  costs  for each  unit previously
produced  and  therefore  increases  profits  by area  hnkl. Profts also  increase  by the difference  between
revenue  and  cosu for the exta units  produced,  area nik. From the point  of view of the country,
however,  the increase  in domestic  processing  of the raw  material  creates  an efficiency  loss equal  to
area  min because  the artificially  low  raw  mateials price encourages  the processing  industry  to expand
output  beyond  the point  at which  the price in the world  market  equals  the true cost  of producing  the
final  good, including  the opportunity  costs  of exporting  the raw material. Since  SF*  Is  parallel  to
Sp', but  lies below  It by (P  -P;), area min = area ljL  This part of the transfer  from the raw7
material  producers  is not a gain  to the processing  Industry,  but i  simply  lost due t3 higher  proeeing
costs.
Again,  these  transfers  and costs  can  be measured.  Tho  gain  to the processing  industry  is area
hikl:
Area  hiki  -Q,  dP  ^  2  dO,  dP*
uPzQ.A  d  Pz  d  s  PzF dPP  (9)
QFPz~  2  et  v  PP*  PZ  PZ
-lvs-~ 1  ; 4X/  2.4
where  v is the  value-added  per Uuit  of final  product,  ec =  (dQSIdv)(v/Q#)  Is  the elasticity  of supply
of processing  with  respect  to the value-added  per unit, dQp=(Q#-QF), =PI/Pp is the ratio  of raw
material  cost  to the prce of the fial product,  and  VF = PpQF  is the value  of fnal good  produced.
Note  that  with  the fimn'  product  price unchanged,  dvw-dP 1. Ihe efficiency  loss  due to higher-cost
domesdc  prcessing (area  ijk) equas the second  term in equation  9.  I  Information  on prices  and
quantities  of inputs  and  outputs  are available,  the second  step in equation  9 can  be used for
calcuons,  but the last step is more suitable  when  the only  information  available  is from an input-
output  table  for the economy.
The welfare  impact  aid net efficiency  losses  are the appropriate  criteria  for judging  the
beneficial  or detrimental  effects  of the export  restrictions.  .rt  so much  emphasis  has been  placed  on
using  raw materil export  controls  to encourage  higher-value-added  exports  and therefore  export
earnings  that  we investigate  in detail  the impact  of the raw  material  export  controls  on total export
revenue. Foreign  exchange  earnings  from  final  goods  exports  inerease  by P'F(Qp'-QF*).  Raw
material  exports  fal from  XI* to Xe,  and  export  ening  faU  by P'Y(X 1*-X 1 ).  Export  earings from
exports  of final  goods  increase,  but earnings  from  raw material  exports  decrease  because  the quantity8
exported  decasea by the amolnt diverted  to the domestic  industry,  D1'-D 1 (-QF'.pF),  plus  the
decrese In  production  Q*-Q 1' due to the lower  raw material  price. The not impact  of the raw
material  export  restriction  on told export  eanWs  is ambiguous
The change  In total export  earnings  due to the export  control  on raw mateials would  be the
difference  between  the increase  in the value  of final  good  exports  ad  the decrease  In  the value  of raw
matrial exports. Given  that  XI-Qf  -Qy  and  dQ? - dQl, the change  the value  of raw material
exports  would  be:
d(P'fXzl  - Pz(dQj'  - dQ°z]
-pf  es  r dpz  _ '  - vt  Pz  dvl
px  ~  'r  (10)
AlI, Q dPz  1A  VdP 1 .
m  P[erQz  +4V, 
*  (1'i)erV 1z  *4V,+  epg  V,  !  (1+  ) a
Tho  first term  captures  the decline  in raw materisl  exports  due to the Sfll  In producdon;  the second
captures  the decline  in exports  due  to the diversion  to domestic  processing.
Holding  domestic  demand  for the final good  constant,  and allowing  for free exportaton  of the
processed  good  at an unchanged  world  market  price, the export  restriction  on raw mateials would
increase  exports  of the fnal good. 7 The maitude  of the increase  in procesed good  export
earnings  would  be:
P" dX,  = Pr  e  ?,F  dPr
pw  PzUe  dPt  11
V  P
V,  5,  b  I9
lherefore total export  ears  would  change  by:
dvx  Vp4  1 *x-[  (1.)edVw  * 4  .t4)  (14  e2):]  + 
v, at  x U.- (1+X)*J  -x  (1+w)  efv
Total  export  earinpgs  wil increase  if equadon  (12)  is positive  but  decrease  if It s negaive.
The raw  material  export  control  is more  likely  to increas export  earningp  the greater  the
value-added  in processing  (the smaller  is 0), the greater  the elasticity  of supply  of the processing
industry,  and the smaller  the elasticity  of supply  of the raw material,  and the larger  the processing
industry  relative  to raw material  production.
Ii.  Applcation to Mongolan Cashmere  and Romanlan  Wood  Export Controh
This section  applies  the model  in an attempt  to quantify  the impacts  of two examles of export
controls  on raw materials: the export  licesing requirements  for raw  cashmere  in Mongolia  and  the
export  prohibitions  and quotas  on timber  and  other  basic  lumber  products  In Romania.
Mongolia  has imposed  export  licensing  requirements  on a number  of raw materials. As of
August,  1992,  these  included  live  animals,  wool, raw cashmere,  camel  wool,  sheepskin,  goatskin,  and
timber. 8 Sufficient  data  were  available  to apply  the model  to raw  cashmere. The  values  of the
variables  that  were used  in equations  7 through  12  to calculate  the magnitude  of the transfers  and net
costs  associated  with  the export  licensing  arrangements,  along  with an explanation  of the sources,
appear  in Table 1.
The gains,  losses,  and  net costs  were  estimated  assuming  varying  degrees  of responsiveness  of
both raw material  and final  good  production  to changes  in prices. The calculations  presented  use10
combinations  of elasticity ranges of from 0.5 to 1 for raw cashmere and 1 to 3 for garment
production. 9 The results appear in Table 2.  Of particular  note is the result that the export controls
on raw cashmere appear to reduce total export earnings.10
Also noteworthy  is the magnitude  of the transfers.  Because  a large amount of raw cashmere
is exported, the impact of even the modest 16.6 percent price differental between  the world market
and domestic  price imposes large losses on herdsmen  and allows large gains to those able to export.
The estimated  losses of $5.5  to $7 million  dollars would represent $5  to $7 per person to the
approximately  1 million people in the countryside. The rents generated  from exporting  are about $4
million.
As of March, 1993, Romania imposed  export prohibitions  or quotas on a relatively large
number  of raw material and intermediate  inputs.  These included  wood products that are inputs into
the furniture industry, stardng with logs, timber and firewood, up through lumber, plywood,  particle
board, and veneer. 11
Data on quantities  and values of production  and exports of aU the various products were not
available,  but the 1990 Romanian  input-output  table separately  identifies  the woodworking  and
furniture industries. Estimates  of the impact  of the export controls were based on the input-output
table, under the assumption  that the woodworking  sector represented  production  of inputs used in the
furniture sector. Equations 7 through  12 were used to calculate  estimates  of the magnitude  of the
transfers and net costs associated  with these export restrictions. The values for the variables in those
equations,  and an explanation  of the sources and reasoning  behind them, appear in Table 3.  The
resulting  estimated  impacts of the wood products export controls appear in Table 4.
Romania currentiy imposes restrictions  on cutting of timber to protect the environment  and
allow  rebuilding  of the timber stock.  These restrictions can be interpreted as implying  a zero
elasticity of supply of timber (and therefore wood products) in the short run.  However, in the longit
run additional  planting  and  harvesting  of timber  would  be possible,  so estimates  are presented  using
both  a short-run  scenario,  in which  the elasticity  of supply  of raw material  inputs  is assumed  equal  to
zero, and  the elasticity  of supply  of value-added  in furniture  production  Is assumed  equal  to one, and
alternative  long-run scenarios, in which the elasticity  of supply of raw material input Is assumed  to be
positive. To illustrate  the sensitivity  of the results  to assumptions  about  the elasticities  of supply  of
wood  product  materlI inputs  and furniture,  the results  of two alternative  'long-run scenarios  are
presented,  one  assuming  that both elasticities  of supply  equal  one, and a second  assuming  a low
elastdcity  of supply  of wood  products  of 0.5, but a higher  elasticity  of supply  of furniture  production
of S.
The results  indicate  that  the export  controls  on wood  may  impose  severe  losses  on the wood
input  Iustries.  ho esatimated  decreases  in proft  range  from about  8 to 10  bilion lei per year. If
there  is a nonzero  elasticity  of supply  of wood,  there  are also efficiency  losses  In the wood  market,
esimated  here  between  1 and  2 billion  lei per year. The gain  In tem  of Increased  profitability  of
the furnitue industry  is about 1.5 to 2.3 billion  lei, while  the etmated efficieny losses  from
increased  furniture  production  amont to 200  million  to approximaely  I billion  lei  Ibe result  of the
wood  inputs  export  controls  are ambiguous  and  depend  crucially  on the elasicities  of supply  In  the
two Industies. In the short-run  scenario  In which  wood  inpu  production  cannot  respond  to price
changes,  the export  controls  increase  total  export  earnings  by approximately  2 billion  lei. However,
in the first  long-run  scenario,  auming  equal  elasticities  of supply  of wood  products  and furniture,
the discouraging  effect  of the export  controls  on wood  production  and the diverion of wood  eWport
to furniture  production  decreases  wood  input  exports by almost  14 billion  lel, whie furitre  eworts
increase  by a much  smaller  amnt.  The net result  is a decrease  in total  export  eamings  from wood
products  and furmIture  of over 10  billion  lei.12
Raw material export controls  with monopsonlstlc  procsor
The analysis  so far has assumed  that  the markets  for both inputs  and  outputs  are competitive,
that  is, contain  a large  mnmber  of both  buyers  and  sellers. In many  cases  of raw material  export
controls,  the assumption  of a large mumber  of producers  of the raw  material  may not  diverge  too
much  from  reality,  but in many  cases  there may  be one or only  a few  processors,  which  creates  a
vmonopsonistic  (single  buyer)  market  structure  in the raw  material  marcet. Whether  a monopsony  Is
able  to exercise  monopsony  power  depends  crucially  on the intenatonal trade policy  in effect. If the
raw  materials  processed  by these  firms  can  be freely  exported,  then  these  processors  may  not  be able
to effectively  exercise  monopsony  power. They  will  have  to compete  with  potential  exporters  of the
raw  mterals  and  will be forced  to pay the world  market  prices  for their inputs. On the other  hand,
if the inputs  cannot  be exported  or if exports  are limited  to predetermined  quantities,  then  the
processors  will be able  to control  the price  of the raw materials  through  their purchasing  decisions.  A
relevant  quesdon  may  very well  be whether  a monopsonistic  market  structure  changes  any  of the basic
conclusions  above  with respect  to the impact  of export  controls  of the raw material.
The dmination  of prices,  production,  and exports  of raw materials  and  processed  products
in the case  of a monopsonistic  market  structure  in the absenc of any export  restriction  is illustrated  in
Figure  3.  As in the previous  figures,  the upper  panel  represents  the market  and  production
conditions  for the final  product  and the lower  panel  the market  and supply  conditons  for the raw
material  WpuL  In the upper  panel  D represents  the demand  curve  for the final  product  and MC(V)
represents  the marginal cost for factors of production  oaU  the raw matial  Input.  Ihe extra
cost  of an extra  'unt  of raw matal  input  must  be added  vertically  to MC(V)  to obtain  the
marginal  cost  of production  curve  MC. If the world  market  price  of the input  is Pt',  and exporters
are free to export  at this price, the processor  will also  have  to pay Pt',  and the marginal  cost  curve
for the processor  will be MC as shown  in the upper  panel  of figure  3.  If the world  market  price  of13
the flnal  product  Is  P'F, then  the processor  would  maximize  profits  by producig at an output  level  of
* 12 The quanty of the final  good  exported  would  be XF*  the difference  between  Qp  and
DF*. The value  of export  earnings  from final  product  exports  would  be the area abcd  In flure 3.
In the input  market,  the processor  would  demand  D1*  unit of input,  the producers  would
supply  Ql  at the  price Pf,  so the quantity  exported  would  be Xi* (=Q 1*-D*).  Earnings  from
exports  of the raw material  would  be P'XI *, equal  to area efgh.
Compare  tdis outcome  with  the resulting  prices,  production  and export  earnings  If exports  of
the raw  material  are limited  by some  form of quantative export  restriction,  such  as a restrictive
licensing  system,  an export  quota,  or an export  ban or embargo. The analysis  is developed  in the
form  of an export  ban  because  it Is  the simplest  to illustrate  and Mongolia  has banned  exports  of
certain  raw materials  at tmes in the past. The results  woud be similar  with  other  forms of
quantitative  export  restrictions. 13
A ban on exports  of the raw  material  input  implies  that  the single  processor  faces  the upward
sloping  supply  curve  of the raw material  input  SI. Ihe greater  the output  of the processor,  the more
raw material  purchased,  and  the higher  the resulting  market  price  of the raw mateial.  Because  the
processor  would  drive  up the market  price for aUl  unit of the inputs  used, not  just the last unit bought,
the extra  cost  of an extra  unit of input  to the processor  will exceed  the market  price. A curve
showing  the extra cost  of extra  units  of input,  labeled  MCI  in the lower  panel  of  Figure 4, can  be
derived  from  the input  supply  curve  SI.14 After  the restriction  on the exportation  of thc input,  the
marginal  cost  of the final good  would  be MC'. It is derived  by adding  MC, to MC(V). The
monopsonistic  processor  can still  sell in the world  market  at P'Y, so the processor's  profits  would  be
maximized  at Qp', the output  level at which  the world  market  price  equals  the marginal  cost of
production.  In the case illustrated  in Figure  4, this would  be at a lo  output  level than  without  the
export  ban. The  processor  reduces  output  because  lowering  output  reduces  the demand  for the input14
and reduces  his cost for the raw material Inputs. As shown in figure 4, when only one profit
maximizing  processor buys a raw material on the domestic  markt,  an export  ban on the raw matial
eliminates  exports of the raw material, and can decrease production  and exports of the final good.  In
this case, IgtaI  export earings  from both the fnal product and the raw materiS must decrease.
Figure 4 illustrates  the case In which total export earnings  fail, but this result is not unambiguous. If
exports of the raw material are large relative to production of the final good, output and exports of
the fil  good may increae. i
As In the competitive  industry case analyzed  first in this appendix, the export ban will reduce
real income or profits of the raw material producers and increase the profits of the processing
industry. Revenues  of the raw material producers fall from efgh to ijkh.  Revenue  from raw material
exports wiU  fall by lfgk.  Of this reduction in export revenue, 14 represents  a net loss to the country
because it is the difference  between  export revenues  lost and the incremental  cost  of producing  the
quantity that would have been exported  in the absence  of the export ban.  Area elji represents a
transfer from raw materials producers to the processing firm.
CONCLUSIONS
Export controls on raw materials  reduce raw material prices to domestic  processing industties
and encourage  domestic  processing, but hurt raw material producers and cause economic  distortions
that result in net losses to the country. Exports of raw materials are sometimes  controlled  in an
attempt to increase export earnings by promoting  exports of higher value-added  processed goods
rather than raw materials. However, the impact  of raw materil  export controls  on total export
earnings  is ambiguous; the decline in raw materia exports when production  is discouraged  by lower
prices may outweigh  the effect of increased processed  goods exports.
Estimates  of the magnitude  of the transfers and costs of export controls  on raw cashmere in15
Mongolia  and wood products in Romania indicate  that the transfers and costs involved  may be
substantial. These estimates  are designed  to be illustrative  rather than definitive, because  no esdmates
of actual supply elasticities in the raw material and processing industries  in these countries are
available, so the estimates  are based on a range of assumed  values for these elasticities. Despite these
caveats the calculations  do indicate  that in both these eases the export controls, under reasonable
assumptions  of elasticities  of supply, may transfer significant  amounts  of profits from the raw material
producers to the processing industries, cause  significant  net losses, and result in a substantial  decrease
in export earnings.
The impact  of quantitative  controls  on exports will be even more distortive if processing
industries  have some degree of monopsony  power, which is quite likely in developing  countries with
small industrial bases, or economies  in transition  where central planning  has left a legacy of very
large firms in highly concentrated  industries. WitlA  monopsony  power in the processing industry,
both output and exports of final products may be reduced by quaniative  export controls on raw
material inputs, because the quantitative  control bestows  effective monopsony  power on the processing
firm and encourages  it to exploit this monopsony  power by reducing output.16
ENDNOTES
1.  This paper is based on research for the UNDP/World  Bank Trade Expansion Program reports
for Mongolia  and Romania. The author  thanks Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya for useful
comments  on a previous draft.  The views are those of the author, not necessarily  those of the
United Nations or of the World Bank.
2.  In England Elizabeth  I banned the exportation  of vwool  fleeces in the 16th century to encourage
the textile industry. Other modern examples include  Uruguayan  prohibitions  on exports of raw
hides.  Many countries currently undertaking  the transition from central planning to a market
economy  also control raw material exports.
3.  For Romanian  wood products this assumption  is reasonable. In the case of cashmere, however,
Mongolia may have the ability to  influence world market prices.  Published estimates of
Mongolia's share of world raw cashmere production  range between 10 percent (Browne, 1990)
and 2025 percent (Economist  Intelligence  Unit, 1991). Mongolia  exports both raw cashmere  and
knitted cashmere products, so higher world market prices for raw cashmere increase export
earnings  directly and also indirectly  by increasing  the costs of competing  firms in the market for
knitted cashmere  products. For an analysis  of the potential  welfare gains from exploiting  market
power in world raw material markets when a country also exports the final product, see Jones
and Spencer (1989). Including  market power in world markets in the model would  be a useful
extension  of this paper.
4.  This approach is based on Corden (1973, pp. 30-35). Suppose  that the processing industry uses
et inputs to produce one unit of output.  Then each "package"  of cm  inputs woid  be a "unit" of
inputs. For example, if 10 ounces of raw cashmere were used to produce a sweater, then a 10-
ounce ball of raw cashmere would be one "unit" of input.  If the price of an ounce of cashmere
were $1.00, then the price of a "unit" of input would $10.00.
5.  Income is omitted  as a determinant  of demand  because  of the partial equilibrium  assumption.
6.  The limit case of a complete  ban on exports of the raw material would be analyzed  as a zero
quota.
7.  The increase in exports may be underestimated  in the partial equilibrium framework  used here
if income  feedback  effects are important. Lower real incomes  due to the efficiency  losses could
reduce domestic demand for cashmere products, which are presumably luxury goods.  On the
other hand, lower income  may reduce  imports  and therefore  exports through balance  of payments
or exchange  rate effects.
8.  This list is based on information  from the License Bureau, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
Exports of other products also were subject  to license: scrap copper,  scrap iron, scrap aluminum,
scrap aluminum alloy, scrap steel, meat, wheat, children's clothes and shoes, and imported17
9.  Elasticities of supply of processing with respect to value-added  of up to  10 were tried, but
elasticities  of over 3.4 resulted in such large estimated  impacts on processing  that output would
have become negative  In the absence of the export controls.  The large impact on processing
stems in part from the high ratio of the price of raw cashmere input relative to the price of
finished garments. Raw cashmere  cost Is over half the price of the finished  garment, so a drop
in the price of raw cashmere at constant  final good prices represents  a larger percentage  increase
in the value-added  per unit.
10.  With a smaU elasticity  of supply of raw material and a large elasticity of supply of processing
(e!=0.5;e;=  10), export earnings increased by a relatively modest $80,608, achieved at an
estimated  cost of $718,186  in deadweight  efficiency  losses. This case is not reported because  the
estimates  at these  high elasticity  levels indicated  that output  would  decrease so much that it would
become negative, which would result in nonsensical  calculations  of transfers.
11.  Order No. 120 of 31 July 1992  prohibited the export of logs, rafters, lumber, railway sleepers,
Christmas fir  trees, firewood, wood for  cellulose, fiberboard, timber, wooden paUets and
veneers, and imposed  the following  quotas:
Produt  Ouant
Beech-tree  plywood  50,000  m3
Panels  1,300,000  m: 2
Beech-tree  parquet  500,000 m2
Chipboard  800,000 m2
Timber and semifabs  300,000 mn 2
of resinous woods, beech
and softwoods
Door and windowframes  1,000,000 m2
12.  This analysis  presumes that the behavior  of the processing  firm is to attempt  to maximize  profits.
In a transitional economy  such as Mongolia, it is not clear what the objective  of firms that are
still state-owned  actually  is.  As these firms become privatized  and thus presumably responsive
to the shareholders' desire for high dividends  or growth in share value, firms wiUl  presumably
shift their objectives  to profit maximization.
13.  It  is important to  note that discouraging exports through an  export ta  will not  give the
monopsonistic  processor  control over the domestic  market price.  The export tax wil  lower the
input price, but exporters  wiUl  stil be free to export as long as they pay the tax, so price wiUl  fahl
no lower than the world market price mims the tax.  The export tax system will also yield
revenue for the government,  rather than profits in the form of quota rents to exporters who are
able to obtain licenses.
14.  The marginal cost curve of the input wiUl  lie half-way between the supply curve SI and thb
vertical price axis.  See Ferguson  and Maurice (1979) or virally  any other intemediate level
microeconomic  theory textbook for an explanation  of the analysis  of monopsony.18
15.  MC' -uust  cross MC at the output  level  at which  MCI  crossed  a horizontal  line of height  P 1W.
This  poit  (shown  as point  a) lies  to the I& of  Q*  in the case  shown  in figure  A.4.4). Because
MC' must  be steeper  than  MC,  the quantity  produced  by the  processor  (and  therefore  the  quantity
exported  with  unchanged  demand  condition)  must  be lower. If the supply  cunre  had  been  much
further  to the right  (passing  through  b, for example)  then MC,  would  have  passed  through  point
c, MC' would  have  crossed  MC at point  d with a steeper  slope,  and output  and exports  of the
final  good  could  increase. In this case  the value  of the extra  exports  of final  good  would  have
to be balanced  with the elimination  of exports  of the raw material  to determine  whether  total
export  eamings  decrease  or increase. Large exports  of the raw material  relative  to domestic
production  of the tinal good Increases  the probability  that there will be an increase  in output
because  point  a will be at a larger  output  level.19
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Table 1
Variables Used in Calculations  of the Impact of Mongolian  Cashmere Export Licensing Requirements
P  w  $25.89/"package"  Data provided  by the large Gobi factory indicate  that the factory took in
900 tons of  raw cashmere, approximately 450  tons of  which was
exported as  greasy  or  dehaired cashmere,  approximately 80  tons
processed for export  as tops, and the remaining  370 tons used to produce
garments. This would imply  that 370,000  kilos of unprocessed  cashmere
was processed into 250,300 garments.  The "package" of unprocessed
cashmere input per piece produced, on average, would be  1.48 kilos.
The  unit  value  of  unprocessed cashmere  exports  in  1992  was
$17.49/kilo: 1657.53  metric tons valued  at US$28,986,430  (Ministry of
Trade and Industry).  Thus the world market price of a  "package" of
input would be US$25.89.
PF  $35.05/piece  Unit value of exports of cashmere garments in 1992:  142,190 pullovers
were  exported valued at  US$7,664,460;  US$341,970 of  "other
garments" were exported, but no quantity figures were available. Data
provided by the large Gobi factory indicated that they had produced
approximately  95,800 other garments in  1992, and approximately 90
percent of their output is exported. This would imply exports of 86,220
other garments.  Thus an estimated 228,410 garments were exported
valued at US$8,006,430
.XI  1,119,953  Exports  of  unprocessed cashmere in  1992 were  1,657,530 kilos,
equivalent  to 1,119,953 "packages"  of inputs.
Qp  275,300  Large  Gobi factory output of  approximately 250,300 pieces,  plus
estimated 25,000 of small Gobi factory.
Q,  1,395,253  Raw material outpu. measured in "packages"  of inputs equals finished
product production  plus exports of raw material
dP,  $3.69  Data provided  by the Gobi factory indicate  that the price of unprocessed
cashmere in 1992 was 600 tugriks/kilo (at the official exchange rate of
40 tugrik/US$,  $15.00/kilo)  for unprocessed  cashmere. This would  imply
a domestic price of $32.40 per "package" of input, $3.69 below the
export price.
ir  .166  Calculated  as dP,/(Pw,-dPj)
10  0.633  Calculated  as (Pw,-dPO)/PwF
E,M  0.5 to 3 5  Elasticities  of supply of unprocessed  cashmere and cashmere garments,
respectively.21
Table 2
Estimated  Impact of Mongolian  Cashmere  Export Licensing  Requirements
(US dollars)
Elasticity  of supply of cashmere  0.5  1  0.5
Elasticity  of supply of garments  1  1  3
Loss to cashmere producers  5,362,424  5,576,364  5,362,424
Efficiency  loss in cashmere production  213,940  427,881  213,940
Gain to garments industry  870,000  870,000  578,287
Efficiency  loss in garments production  145,857  145,857  437,570
Decline in raw material export  5,048,857  8,050,979  9,142,326
Increase in garments export eanings  2,770878  2,770,878  8,312,635
Change in total export earnings  -2,277,979  -5,280,101  -829,691
Transfer to export license recipients  4,132,627  4,132,627  4,132,627
Total efficiency loss  236,922  420,371  634,266
Increase in gannents production  (units)  79,055  79,055  237,16522
Table 3
Data for Estimation  of Impact of Romanian Wood Export Controls
VI  16,959  Value of output of woodworking  industry.  (millions  of lei)  Data are
from the 1990  Romanian  input-output  table for the woodworking  sector
(sector  32)
VI  20,868  Value of  furniture output (sector 77  of  1990 input-output table)
(millions  of lei)
tvx  230  Value of  exports under  quota of  plywood, laminated board  and
chipboard,  all potential inputs for the furniture  industry (millions  of lei)
0.24  PI/PF,  calculated  from ratio of value of inputs  of woodworking  industry
into the furniture industry to value of output  of furniture  industry from
1990 input-output  table.
r  0.5  (Pw,-P,)/P,,  the percentage difference  between  the world and domestic
price of  raw  material inputs due  to  the export controls on  raw
materials.  A study of the Romanian wood-based industries by the
Swedish  consulting  firm Jaakko Poyry (1992) estimated  that the prices
of wood material input costs for the furniture industry were far below
the prices in other countries. Input costs were less than half the costs
in the next-least  expensive country, Poland.  Costs of half the world
market price would imply a cost differential as a percentage of the
domestic  price of 100%. Romanian  critics of the Jaakko Poyry study
argue that it overestimates  the wood price differential, and that 50%
would be a  better estimate.  The 50% figure is used here, but the
estimates  of the costs and transfers would be even larger than those
calculated  if the actual price differential  is larger.
e,F  0  to 5  Assumed  elasticities  of supply23
Table 4
Estimated  Impact of Romanian  Wood Export Controls
[hort  run  Lone run
Millions  of lei  63=0  es-1  efrO.5
eg-  ep  eF5
Loss to wood indwutries  8,480  10,599  9,539
(area adge)
Efficiency  loss in wood industries  0  2,120  1,060
industry (area cdg)
Transfer to export license  115  115  115
recipients  (area bcgf)
Gain to furniture industry  2,306  2,306  1,516
(area hikl)
Efficiency  loss in furniture industry  198  198  988
(area ijk)
Decline in wood exports  1,186  13,905  12,291
Increase in furniture exports  3,294  3,294  16,475
Change in total exports  2,108  -10,610  4,18424
FIGURE  1:





D*  ~  D  Q,
F  ~~~~F
I  ~~~~~~St









0  - --  15 .1  .D  's-I
C%I￿ 
I



















. Ii  Oam  - Zar 
0  S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1
4  l- - - l  - - - - - - - - -!




WI  -S~cPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1264 A Rock  and  a Hard  Place:  The  Two  J. Michael  Finger  March  1994  M. Patena
Faces  of U.S.  Trade Policy  Toward  Korea  37947
WPS1265 Parallel  Exchange  Rates  in  Miguel  A. Kiguel  March  1994  R. Luz
Developing  Countries:  Lessons  from  Stephen  A. O'Connell  34303
Eight  Case  Studies
WPS1266 An Efficient  Frontier  for International  Sudhakar  Satyanarayan  March  1994  D. Gustafson
Portfolios  with Commodity  Assets  Fanos  Varangis  33732
WPS1267 The  Tax  Base  in Transition:  The  Case Zeljko  Bogetic  March  1994  F. Smith
of Bulgaria  Arye  L. Hillman  36072
WPS1268 The  Reform  of Mechanisms  for  Eliana  La Ferrara  March  1994  N. Artis
Foreign  Exchange  Allocation:  Theory  Gabriel  Castillo  38010
and Lessons  from Sub-Saharan  John Nash
Africa
WPS1269 Union-Nonunion  Wage  Differentials  Alexis Panagides  March  1994  I  Conachy
in the Developing  World:  A Case  Harry  Anthony  Patrinos  33669
Study  of Mexico
WPS1270 How Land-Based  Targeting  Affects  Martin  Ravallion  March  1994  P. Cook
Rural  Poverty  Binayak  Sen  33902
WPS1271 Measuring  the Effect  of External  F. Desmond  McCarthy  March  1994  M. Divino
Shocks  and the Policy  Response  to  J. Peter  Neary  33739
Them:  Empirical  Methodology  Applied Giovanni  Zanalda
to the Philippines
WPS1272  The Value  of Superfund  Cleanups:  Shreekant  Gupta  March  1994  A. Maranon
Evidence  from U.S. Environmental  George  Van Houtven  39074
Protection  Agency  Decisions  Maureen  L. Cropper
WPS1273 Desired  Fertility  and  the Impact  of  Lant H. Pritchett  March  1994  P.  Cook
Population  Policies  Lawrence  H. Summers  33902
WPS1274 The  New  Traue  Theory  and Its  Asad  Alam  March  1994  A. Alam
Relevance  for Developing  Countries  87380
WPS1275 Female-Headed  Households,  Ricardo  Barros  March  1994  K. Binkley
Poverty,  and  the Welfare  of Children  Louise  Fox  81143
in Urban  Brazil
WPS1276 Is There Persistence  in the Growth  Ashoka  Mody  March  1994  M. Patefla
of Manufactured  Exports?  Evidence  Kamil  Yilmaz  37947
from Newly  Industrializing  Countries
WPS1277 Private  Trader  Response  to Market  Steven Jaffee  March  1994  C. Spooner
Liberalization  in Tanzania's  Cashew  32116
Nut IndustryPolicy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1278  Regulation  and  Commitment  in  the  Ahmed  Galal  March  1994  B.  Moore
Development  of  Telecommunications  38526
in  Chile
WPS1279  Optimal  Hedging  Strategy  Revisited:  Ying  Qian  March  1994  S. Lipscomb
Acknowledging  the Existence  of  Ronald  Duncan  33718
Nonstationary  Economic  Time  Series
WPS1280  The  Economic  Impact  of  Export  Wendy  E.  Takacs  March  1994  M. Patefna
Controls:  An  Application  to Mongolian  37947
Cashmere  and  Romanian  Wood  Products